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PROTECTING U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD: WHY FOREIGN STATES
SHOULD NOT BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR
THEIR MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects
U.S. citizens from "cruel and unusual" punishment.1 U.S. citizens
in foreign countries, however, do not benefit from this protection.
For example, James Smrkovski, a U.S. citizen working for Saudia
Airlines, was a prisoner in a Saudi Arabian jail for 454 days be-
cause he refused to inform police about a friend suspected of drug
and arms smuggling. 2 While imprisoned, he was "repeatedly
forced to maintain uncomfortable body positions or do knee bends
till fully exhausted, subjected to humiliation, death threats, beat-
ings, electric shocks and at one point even mutilation of six toe-
nails."' 3 Although the U.S. government is aware of the mistreat-
ment of its citizens in foreign prisons, 4 it does not provide them an
expedient means to redress such abuse. The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 19765 denies U.S. citizens the opportunity to
hold foreign states accountable in U.S. courts for mistreatment of
U.S. citizens in their prisons.
This Comment examines the soundness of granting a foreign
state immunity from suits in U.S. courts brought by U.S. citizens
for inhumane treatment in foreign prisons. Part II of this Com-
ment examines international laws governing the treatment of pris-
oners, which serve as the foreign equivalent of the Eighth
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. See Robert Green, American Businessmen Say They Were Tortured in Saudi Jails,
REUTER Bus. REP., June 15, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Problems Confronting American Businessmen in Saudi Arabia: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East of the House Comm. on Foreign Af-
fairs, 100th Cong. 142 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Hearing].
5. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1995)).
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Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment.6 Compliance with these laws is mandatory for Middle East-
ern countries because they are signatories to the United Nations
Charter and the laws themselves. It appears, however, that Middle
Eastern countries still maintain a harsh administration of criminal
justice. Part III of this Comment discusses Middle Eastern coun-
tries' present practices toward prisoners, which reflect the coun-
tries' failure to adopt international law standards. Part IV docu-
ments U.S. citizens' past experiences in the prisons of a particular
Middle Eastern country, Saudi Arabia.
U.S. citizens released from Middle Eastern prisons experience
only short-term gratification upon their return to the United
States. They often find that the extent of restitution for their mis-
treatment abroad is limited to the cessation of being subjected to
the inhumane practices in Middle Eastern prisons. Beyond that,
their complaints fall mainly on "deaf ears." Part V of this Com-
ment addresses the options available to U.S. citizens to redress
violations of their rights as prisoners.
A civil suit in the United States against the foreign state
would be the ideal option to compensate U.S. citizens for mis-
treatment in Middle Eastern prisons, as well as to deter foreign
states from abusing other U.S. citizens. Part VI of this Comment
explores the current law governing the ability of U.S. citizens to
sue foreign states in U.S. courts. As recently as 1993, the U.S. Su-
preme Court upheld foreign states' immunity from such suits. 7
This leaves U.S. citizens who suffered in foreign prisons with no
recompense, and U.S: citizens who visit or reside in the Middle
East with no certain recourse if they also fall victim to prison
abuse. Thus, part VII of this Comment proposes how the law
should be changed.
6. The U.S. Constitution has greatly impacted the development of international
human rights law. It "has helped to shape the norms found in the principal international
human rights instruments and, at least initially, to assist in their clarification." Richard B.
Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 53,56 (1990).
7. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
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II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS GOVERNING THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
A. The Development of International Human Rights Law
Applicable to Prisoners
After witnessing the blatant disregard of human rights during
World War II, the international community abandoned its belief
that human rights were a matter to be left to the states' domestic
jurisdiction.8 Post-war efforts to protect people from abuse by
their own governments laid the foundation for the development of
international human rights law.9 Such efforts began with the for-
mation of the United Nations in 1945.10 The international com-
munity established this organization to "reaffirm faith in funda-
mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and small."11 One of the main purposes of the United Nations was
"[t]o achieve international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charac-
ter, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion."' 12 The U.N. Charter clearly called for col-
lective action, and by ratifying the Charter, member states surren-
dered their "reserved domain" with regard to human rights and
pledged "to take action in co-operation [sic] with the Organization
itself."13
The United Nations' first major step towards the creation of
international human rights law was the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) on Decem-
ber 10, 1948.14 The United Nations intended the Universal Decla-
8. See NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE* TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 2 (1987).
9. See id. at 3.
10. See David Weissbrodt, An Introduction to the Sources of International Human
Rights Law, C399 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 8 (1989).
11. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
12. Id. art. 1, para. 3. (emphasis added).
13. PIETER N. DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS 29-30 (1965).
14. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
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ration to elaborate on the Charter. 15 At the time of its adoption,
however, the Universal Declaration was "[n]ot intended as a
source of legal obligations on the part of states or of legal rights on
the part of individuals. ' 16 Because the United Nations adopted
the Universal Declaration only as a recommendation of the Gen-
eral Assembly, 17 it was not a treaty and its provisions were not
binding. 18 As international human rights law developed, however,
the United Nations codified many of the Universal Declaration's
significant provisions in multilateral treaties and "established pro-
cedures for their implementation, both in the treaties and in the
organs of the U.N. itself."19 The Universal Declaration has since
been "recognized as providing the most authoritative definition of
the human rights obligations that governments undertake in join-
ing the U.N."'20
The Universal Declaration was merely the first part of what
became known as the International Bill of Human Rights. The
United Nations completed the Bill in 1966 with the adoption of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, along with an
Optional Protocol; 21 and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.22 These two Covenants "make
15. See DROST, supra note 13, at 33. For example, one of the Charter's purposes is
"[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. Article 3 of the
Universal Declaration states: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of per-
son." G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 14, at 72.
16. DROST, supra note 13, at 34.
17. The General Assembly is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations;
the other five are the Security Council, the Economic and Social. Council, the Trusteeship
Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat. See DEP'T OF PUBLIC
INFO., UNITED NATIONS, EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS 11 (9th ed. 1979). The General
Assembly is composed of all U.N. members. See id. It has broad authority and may con-
sider "any question or any matter within the scope of the [U.N.] Charter or relating to the
powers and functions of any organ provided for in the Charter." Id.
18. See DROST, supra note 13, at 32.
19. Weissbrodt,supra note 10, at 9.
20. Id. This recognition is significant to the treatment of prisoners because article 5
of the Universal Declaration states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment." G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 14, at 73.
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368; Optional Protocol to Recognize Competence of Human Rights
Committee to Consider Complaints, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 383.
22. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for sig-
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the provisions of the Universal Declaration into legally binding
treaties, provide greater detail about the rights protected,23 and
supply implementation procedures the states parties must fol-
low." 24 Professor David Weissbrodt makes an interesting obser-
vation about these two covenants:
The two Covenants distinguish between the implementation
appropriate for civil and political rights, on the one hand, and
economic, social, and cultural rights, on the other. Civil and
political rights, such as freedom of expression and the right to
be free from torture or arbitrary arrest, are immediately en-
forceable. Economic, social, and cultural rights are to be im-
plemented "to the maximum of available resources, with a view
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights.., by
all the appropriate means, including particularly the adoption
of legislative measures." In other words, governments that ratify
the Covenants must immediately cease to torture their citizens,
but they are not immediately required to feed, clothe, and house
them. These latter obligations are to be accomplished only pro-
gressively as resources permit. 
2 5
The persuasive norms of the International Bill of Human
Rights are echoed in customary international law, which reflects "a
general practice of governments accepted as law."'26 Although
unanimous acceptance of a government practice is not required to
bring the practice under customary international law, such law
"binds all governments, including those that have not recognized
it, so long as they have not expressly and persistently objected to
nature Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360.
23. For example, article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights requires that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person." International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 10, para 1, at 371.
24. Weissbrodt, supra note 10, at 10. The implementation procedures have become
more explicit in recent years: "For example, the Human Rights Committee, which moni-
tors compliance with the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights], has repeatedly asserted
that states parties must investigate torture, disappearances, and extra-legal executions
and attempt to bring the wrongdoers to justice." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, NO. 26,
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 428 (Louis Henkin & John
Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994) (emphasis added).
25. Weissbrodt, supra note 10, at 10 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
26. Id.; FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
594 (1990).
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its development. '27 Thus, the norms in the International Bill of
Human Rights bind even states that are not parties to the instru-
ments.28 In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that
customary international law is "part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate ju-
risdiction, as often as questions of rights depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination."
29
B. Documents Representative of International Human Rights Law
Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners
Of all the intergovernmental organizations, the United Na-
tions has devoted the most attention to the problem of torture and
other ill-treatment.30 The United Nations' formulation of stan-
dards relating to this problem is significant to the treatment of
prisoners because most victims of torture are imprisoned or oth-
erwise detained. 3
1
Although no international convention currently deals exclu-
sively with the treatment of prisoners or prisoners' rights, several
U.N. documents are considered very influential. 32 One such
document is the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners (Standard Minimum Rules), which the U.N. Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC)33 formally approved in 1957. 34
ECOSOC designed the Standard Minimum Rules to "set out in
detail the minimum rights and facilities [that] should be made
available to the prisoners. '35 The Standard Minimum Rules, how-
27 NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 26, at 594-95.
28. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW 79-80 (1989).
29. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
30. See RODLEY, supra note 8, at 18.
31. See Suzanne M. Bernard, An Eye for an Eye: The Current Status of International
Law on the Humane Treatment of Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 759, 766 (1994).
32. See id. at 770.
33. Article 62 of the U.N. Charter authorizes ECOSOC to "'make recommendations
for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all."' U.N. CHARTER art. 62, para. 2.
34. E.S.C. Res. 663C, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957)
(amended 1977), reprinted in SATISH CHANDRA, INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 229-49 (1990).
35. HURST HANNUM & RICHARD B. LILLICH, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 (1985). For example, rule 27 pro-
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ever, do not have the force of law because ECOSOC has no legis-
lative authority. 36 But author Nigel Rodley notes that the Stan-
dard Minimum Rules may provide guidance
in interpreting the general requirement of Covenant [on Civil
and Political Rights] article 10(1) of humane treatment and re-
spect for human dignity, as well as the specific requirement in
Covenant article 10(3) which states that "the penitentiary sys-
tem shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of
which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation." 37
Furthermore, three U.N. General Assembly resolutions have ad-
vised member states to implement the Standard Minimum Rules in
the administration of penal and correctional institutions. 38 In the
United States, the Standard Minimum Rules have been adopted as
guidelines in several states and "have been cited as evidence of
contemporary standards relevant to the scope of the Eighth
Amendment's embodiment of 'broad and idealistic standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' 39
Another significant document addressing the treatment of
prisoners is the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment (Declaration Against Torture),
which the U.N. General Assembly adopted in 1975.40 The Decla-
ration Against Torture expanded and refined the content of the
vides: "Discipline and order shall be maintained with firmness, but with no more restric-
tion than is necessary for safe custody and well-ordered community life." E.S.C. Res.
663C, supra n6te 34, at 234. Rule 35(1) states: "Every prisoner shall be provided with
written information about the regulations governing the treatment of prisoners of his
category, the disciplinary requirements of the institution, [and] the authorized methods of
seeking information and making complaints ... ." Id. at 236. Rule 65 indicates: "The
treatment [of prisoners] shall be such as will encourage their self-respect and develop
their sense of responsibility." Id. at 243. Rule 66(1) adds: "To these ends, all appropriate
means shall be used, including religious care in the countries where this is possible, edu-
cation, vocational guidance and training, social casework, employment counselling, physi-
cal development and strengthening of moral character, in accordance with the individual
needs of each prisoner .... " Id.
36. See Bernard, supra note 31, at 771.
37. RODLEY, supra note 8, at 222-23.
38. See Bernard, supra note 31, at 773 (citing G.A. Res. 2858, U.N. GAOR, 26th
Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94, U.N. Doc. A18588 (1971); G.A. Res. 3144, U.N. GAOR, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 85, U.N. Doc. A/9425 (1973)).
39. HANNUM & LILLICH, supra note 35, at 45.
40. G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A1034
(1975).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights.41 When the General As-
sembly adopted the Declaration Against Torture, however, the in-
ternational community hesitated to accept specific implementation
measures pertaining to torture.42 Thus, the General Assembly
adopted the Declaration Against Torture only as a "guideline" for
member states.43 It was not until the 1980s when the General As-
sembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to draft a
convention based on the Declaration Against Torture that in-
cluded implementation measures.44 The United Nations adopted
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Tor-
ture) in 1984.45 The Convention Against Torture requires each
member state to "ensure that all acts of torture are offences under
its criminal law" and to "make these offences punishable by ap-
propriate penalties [that] take into account their grave nature. '46
Both the Standard Minimum Rules and the Declaration
Against Torture set forth guidelines for U.N. member states re-
garding the treatment of prisoners. International law does not im-
pose a very high standard of treatment for prisoners, as countries
are merely responsible for following minimum rules.47 Neverthe-
41. See RODLEY, supra note 8, at 61. For example, article 5 of the Universal Decla-
ration states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 14, at 73. Article 2 of the Decla-
ration Against Torture indicates: "Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment is an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a
denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a violation of the hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights." G.A. Res. 3452, supra note 40, at 91.
42. See RODLEY, supra note 8, at 111.
43. G.A. Res. 3452, supra note 40.
44. See RODLEY, supra note 8, at 126. The Commission on Human Rights' compe-
tence to deal with human rights violations stems from ECOSOC resolutions 1102 and
1164, General Assembly resolution 2144, and Commission on Human Rights resolutions
2, 8 and 9. See B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE CONCEPT AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FORTY YEARS AFTER THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 63 (1989). The Commission has publicly considered human
rights violations each year since 1966. See id. at 65.
45. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (entered into force June 26, 1987)
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
46. Id. art. 4, paras. 1-2, at 1028.
47. See RODLEY, supra note 8, at 221.
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less, "[t]he international prohibition of 'torture' or 'cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment' is clearly broader
than the 'cruel and unusual punishment' standard of the Eighth
Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution], at least in its inclusion of
'treatment' as well as punishment."
48
C. The Applicability of International Instruments Addressing the
Treatment of Prisoners to Middle Eastern Countries
As U.N. members, 49 Middle Eastern countries must comply
with the standards set forth in various U.N. documents dealing
with the treatment of prisoners. The United Nations is continu-
ously working to implement the laws embodied in its official
documents. For example, the Standard Minimum Rules now re-
quire member states to report to the Secretary General every five
years on the "extent of the implementation and the progress made
with regard to the application" of the rules. 50 The Secretary Gen-
eral then uses these responses to prepare periodic reports detailing
which countries have yet to implement the Standard Minimum
Rules and what obstacles to the rules' implementation currently
exist.51
Similarly, article 20 of the Convention Against Torture pro-
vides a procedure whereby the Committee Against Torture may
monitor states' practices:
[W]here the Committee 'receives reliable information which
appears to it to contain well-founded indications that torture is
being practised systematically in the territory of a State Party,
the Committee shall invite that State Party to cooperate in the
examination of the information and to this end to submit ob-
servations' on the information.52
If the state party's response does not satisfy the Committee, "or if
48. HANNUM & LILLICH, supra note 35, at 43-44 (emphasis added) (footnote omit-
ted).
49. Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey joined the United Nations in 1945, and
Morocco became a U.N. member in 1956. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF
FACrS 1995, at 845-46 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1994).
50. Procedures for the Effective Implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res. 1984/47, U.N. ESCOR, 76th Sess., Annex 1, at 30,
U.N. Doc. E/1984/84 (1984) (procedure 5).
51. See Bernard, supra note 31, at 774.
52. RODLEY, supra note 8, at 130. "
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'other relevant information' suggests that 'a confidential inquiry' is
warranted, the Committee may designate one or more of its mem-
bers to make such an inquiry and to report back to it 'urgently."' 53
After the inquiry, the Committee reviews the findings and sends
them with its own comments and suggestions to the state party in-
volved. Once the Committee has consulted with the state, the
Committee may attach a summary of the proceedings in its annual
report.54 "This procedure is potentially the most important ele-
ment in the Committee's powers to implement the major obliga-
tion of the Convention. '55
III. THE FAILURE OF MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES TO ADOPT
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW STANDARDS
In order to reshape the unfavorable public perception of their
region, Middle Eastern countries have made efforts to improve
human rights practices within their borders. For example, the
Arab League's revised Pact states that one of its purposes is "'to
guarantee to man his fundamental liberties, and to consider him as
the goal of all political, economic and social action.' 56 In another
instance, in 1992, Turkish legislators submitted a draft law to im-
prove prison conditions and to give prisoners greater rights for
parliamentary action. 57 More importantly, several Middle Eastern
countries, including Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Turkey, have
ratified the Convention Against Torture. 58 Such acts, however,
are hardly illustrative of the actual human rights principles fol-
lowed by Middle Eastern countries. The following reports depict
53. Id. at 131 (footnote omitted).
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Istvan Pogany, Arab Attitudes Toward International Human Rights Law, 2 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 367,372 (1987).
57. See Turkey: Draft Law Improving Prison Conditions is Submitted to Government
for Parliamentary Action, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Sept. 4, 1992, at 29, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
58. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS: A COMPILATION OF
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS OF ESPECIAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED
STATES 221.34-221.35 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 2d ed. 1990) (listing State Parties to the
Convention Against Torture as of January 1, 1990); Morocco Human Rights Practioes,
1994, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH (U.S. Dep't of State, Washington, D.C.), Mar.
1995.
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ongoing Middle Eastern human rights practices aimed at prisoners.
A. Turkey
The U.S. Department of State reported that, "[d]espite the
Constitution's ban on torture, Turkey's accession to the U.N. and
European Conventions Against Torture, and public pledges of
successive governments to end torture, the practice [has] contin-
ued."'59 According to the report of the Human Rights Founda-
tions' Torture Treatment Centers, commonly employed methods
of torture include: high-pressure cold water hoses, electric shock,
beating the soles of the feet, hanging by the arms, blindfolding,
sleep deprivation, and systematic beating.60 Judicial authorities
seldom investigate complaints against officials accused of using
such methods, and they often impose light punishment, such as
suspension, on convicted officials. 61
B. Saudi Arabia
Respect for human rights is similarly lacking in Saudi Arabia.
Prison officials routinely use torture to force confessions from de-
tainees. Some of the torture treatments utilized include: forcing
detainees to do deep knee bends with a rod strapped to the back of
their knees, beating the bare soles of detainees' feet with wire ca-
bles or wooden rods "'until their feet bleed and their toe nails are
raised,"' immersing detainees in drums full of cold water, and ad-
ministering electric shock treatments. 62
C. Morocco
According to the U.S. Department of State, "[a]lthough Mo-
rocco ratified the United Nations' Convention Against Torture in
1993, security forces continued to subject detainees to abuse-
including the use of torture in cases involving state security. ' 63 In
59. Turkey ILuman Rights Practices, 1994, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH (U.S.
Dep't of State, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1995.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Jacqueline M. Young, Note, Torture and Inhumane Punishment of United States
Citizens in Saudi Arabia and the United States Government's Failure to Act, 16 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 663, 674 (1993).
63. Morocco Human Rights Practices, 1994, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH (U.S.
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recent years, only the severity of torture has changed. The current
guidelines from the Ministry of Interior prohibit only methods
"likely to leave visible marks or permanent disabilities. '64 The
most common methods of interrogation under this new rule in-
clude sleep deprivation, chemical inducement of vomiting, and
beating under immobilizing restraint. 65
D. Iran
Amnesty International reported that prisoners have been
whipped in Iran as judicial punishment or as a way to extract in-
formation or confessions, and these whippings have been harsher
than those prescribed by law. "Although some victims have
claimed that the lashes were delivered with minimal force, others.
. [have been] lashed very hard by several officers in turn, and that
the pain was so intense that they lost consciousness."' 66 Amnesty
International also stated that, in some cases, severe whipping re-
sulted in prolonged medical treatment of damage to internal or-
gans.67
E. Egypt
The Middle East Watch report indicated that Egyptian
authorities utilize several forms of torture in prisons, including
"beatings, kickings, electric shock, psychological harassment and
hanging prisoners from their bound wrists."' 68 The torturous ac-
tivities are not limited to the prisoners themselves. Not only are
the prisoners sexually abused, but they are also harassed with
threats of torture or sexual abuse of their wives, daughters or other
female relatives. 69
IV. U.S. CITIZENS' EXPERIENCES IN SAUDI ARABIAN PRISONS
Middle Eastern prison officials even-handedly implement
Dep't of State, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1995.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 26, at 313.
67. See id.
68. Bahaa Elkoussy, Rights Group Accuses Egyptian Authorities of Torturing Detain-
ees, Proprietary to the UPI, July 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File.
69. See id.
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harsh prison practices on all prisoners, natives and foreigners alike.
Although Middle Eastern prison officials repeatedly deny the use
of torture,70 many U.S. citizens have publicly recounted their ex-
periences in the prisons of a particular Middle Eastern country,
Saudi Arabia.
Scott Nelson, a monitoring engineer from North Carolina,
worked for the King Faisal Specialist Hospital in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia. 71 Saudi Arabian police held Nelson for thirty-nine days in
a rat-infested prison cell, where they repeatedly shackled, tortured,
and beat him. 72 As a result, Nelson underwent numerous opera-
tions on his knees and suffered panic attacks. 73 Furthermore, his
wife, Vivian, claimed that the Saudi police offered to free her hus-
band in return for sexual favors. 74
Henry S. Ramsey, a senior planning and programs analyst,
worked for the Arab-American Corporation (ARAMCO). 75 Po-
lice arbitrarily arrested Ramsey at the Dhahran International Air-
port for "drug smuggling." 76 While in prison, the guards tortured
Ramsey by tying a dowel behind the bend of his knees with a small
rope and forcing him to do repeated deep knee bends for ap-
proximately ten to fifteen minutes until he finally collapsed.77 As
he bent down, he heard his knees crack and felt the joints sepa-
rate. 78
Alvin Levine, a Houston engineer, was another ARAMCO
70. See, e.g., Court Nixes Suit Against Saudi Arabia, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 23, 1993, at
11A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
71. See Richard Carelli, Supreme Court Protects Foreign Governments Against Suits,
AP, Mar. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Young, supra note 62, at 676 (citing 1987 Hearing, supra note 4, at 62-63
(testimony of Henry S. Ramsey)).
76. See id.
77. See id at 676-77. A dowel is "a piece of wood driven into a wall so that other
pieces may be nailed to it." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 681
(1986). The dowel tied to Ramsey "was approximately three feet long and one and one-
quarter to one and one-half inches in diameter." Young, supra note 62, at 676-77 (citing
1987 Hearing, supra note 4, at 62-63 (testimony of Henry S. Ramsey)).
78. See Young, supra note 62, at 677 (citing 1987 Hearing, supra note 4, at 62-63
(testimony of Henry S. Ramsey)).
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employee who suffered similar abuse.79 He encountered Saudi
police at his home located in a compound for ARAMCO employ-
ees.80 The police held a machine gun to his wife's head as they
searched for pornography. 81  After his arrest, the police kept
Levine in a desert confinement for two weeks with no air and no
fan, and repeatedly beat him with a hose on the kidneys and bam-
boo poles to the feet.8
2
These accounts depict a few instances of U.S. citizens' mis-
treatment in a particular Middle Eastern country's prisons. With
thousands of U.S. citizens visiting and living in Saudi Arabia and
the Middle East,83 similar incidences are likely to continue.
V. U.S. CITIZENS' LIMITED OPTIONS TO REDRESS VIOLATIONS OF
THEIR RIGHTS IN MIDDLE EASTERN PRISONS
The United States signed the U.N. Convention Against Tor-
ture on April 18, 1988, and the Senate ratified it on October 27,
1990.84 One of the United States' obligations under the Conven-
tion is to provide a means of civil redress to victims of torture.85
At the time of the signing of the Convention, the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA)86 was the primary means of civil redress. The
ATCA provides jurisdiction in U.S. district courts for "any civil
action by an alien, for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States. ' 87 The statute's
reach, however, is significantly limited. First, it provides a remedy
79. See Geoff Davidian, Houstonian Says Americans' Abuse by Saudis Ignored,
Hous. CHRON., May 10, 1992, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. In 1986, the State Department issued a statement indicating that approximately
45,000 U.S. citizens live and work in Saudi Arabia. See 4 Businessmen Say Saudis Abuse
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1986, § 1, at 21, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File. Impliedly, over a million U.S. citizens may live and work throughout the
Middle East.
84. See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, pt. 1 at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84.
85. See id.
86. Alien Tort Claims Act, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 934 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (1995)).
87. Id.
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only to aliens, not to U.S. citizens or permanent residents. 88 Also,
sovereign foreign states and individual government officials acting
within the scope of their official duties are immune from suit.
89
Such limitations reflect the irony created by recognizing each for-
eign state's sovereignty under international law: while interna-
tional law imposes an obligation upon states to make their territo-
ries safe for foreign nationals, no parallel obligation exists with
regard to their own citizens.90
After hearing about the terrible conditions in Middle Eastern
prisons, Congress recently devised a more modern cause of action
for torture.91 In 1992, Congress passed The Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act of 1991 (TVPA),92 which was intended to "carry out
obligations of the United States under the U.N. Charter and other
international agreements pertaining to the protection of human
rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from
an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing." 93
Unlike the ATCA, the TVPA extends a civil remedy to U.S. citi-
zens who were tortured abroad.94 The TVPA, however, is as nar-
row in scope as the ATCA. The TVPA's limitations include: re-
quiring plaintiffs to exhaust all adequate remedies available in the
place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred, 95 and
applying only to individuals "acting under color of official author-
88. See id.; see also Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and Application
of Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C.S. § 1350), Providing for Federal Jurisdiction over Alien's
Action for Tort Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States,
116 A.L.R. FED. 387, 448 (1993) (citing Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc.,
722 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Tex. 1989), Tel-Oren.v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
89. See Donaldson, supra note 88, at 449-51 (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989)).
90. See PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11-12
(1983).
91. See Davidian, supra note 79.
92. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. 1350 (1995)).
93. Id.
94. See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, pt. 1 at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84.
95. See id. at 5. Congress believed that this requirement would ensure that "U.S.
courts [would] not intrude into cases more appropriately handled by courts where the al-
leged torture or killing occurred." Id. Furthermore, "[i]t [would] avoid exposing U.S.
courts to unnecessary burdens, and [could] be expected to encourage the development of
meaningful remedies in other countries. Id.
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ity" and not to foreign states or their agencies or instrumentali-
ties.96 The exhaustion of local remedies requirement is advanta-
geous for foreign states because it gives "the state an opportunity
to redress an alleged breach of international human rights through
its own apparatus and under its national law before the claim be-
comes admissible for consideration by an international author-
ity." 97 This requirement, however, delays a remedy for tortured
U.S. citizens and forces them to adjudicate their claims in a less
democratic system of justice. Consequently, U.S. citizens have few
options for redressing their mistreatment abroad as current laws
preclude them from suing in the United States the foreign gov-
ernments responsible for perpetuating harsh practices in prisons.
VI. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Basis of Doctrine
The U.S. Constitution makes no mention of a foreign gov-
ernment's immunity from suit. In fact, Article III grants federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction over suits against "foreign
states."' 98 But as early as 1812, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
foreign sovereigns were immune from suits in U.S. courts.99 The
Court's justifications for recognizing sovereign immunity included
"the need to protect the dignity of the foreign sovereign, the in-
ability of [a U.S.] court to enforce a judgment against a foreign
sovereign, and the desire for reciprocal immunity for the United
States from suits in foreign countries." 100
B. Absolute v. Restrictive Immunity
The U.S. Supreme Court's initial adjudications on the issue of
96. See id.
97. MERON, supra note 28, at 174.
98. Article III states: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or subjects." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2 (emphasis added). See Beverly May Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in Ameri-
can Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J.
1009, 1011 (1980).
99. See The Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (granting
absolute protection of an armed vessel in the services of a friendly sovereign).
100. Carl, supra note 98 (citing Comment, Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign-State
Enterprise in Alaska, 4 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 343, 347-48 (1975)).
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sovereign immunity created absolute immunity. 10 1  In United
States v. Diekelman,10 2 the Court explained more fully its reasons
for establishing an absolute doctrine:
A sovereign [may not] be sued in his own courts without his
consent. His own dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he
represents, prevents his appearance to answer a suit against him
in the courts of another sovereignty, except in performance of
his obligations, by treaty or otherwise, voluntarily assumed.
Hence, a citizen of one nation wronged by the conduct of an-
other nation, must seek redress through his own government.
His sovereign must assume the responsibility of presenting his
claim, or it need not be considered. If this responsibility is as-
sumed, the claim may be prosecuted as one nation proceeds
against another, not by suit in the courts, as of right, but by di-
plomacy, or, if need be, by war. It rests with the sovereign
against whom the demand is made to determine for himself
what he will do in respect to it. He may pay or reject it; he may
submit to arbitration, open his own courts to suit, or consent to
be tried in the courts of another nation. All depends upon him-
self.10
3
In contrast to the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, the
restrictive theory
tr[ies] to accommodate the interest of individuals doing busi-
ness with foreign governments in having their legal rights de-
termined by the courts, with the interest of foreign govern-
ments in being free to perform certain political acts without
undergoing the embarrassment or hindrance of defending the
propriety of such acts before foreign courts. 104
The restrictive theory distinguishes acts of sovereignty (public
acts), which are exempted from jurisdiction, from acts of jure ges-
101. For example, in The Schooner Exch., Chief Justice John Marshall stated:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would .imply a diminution of
its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sover-
eignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136 (emphasis added).
102. 92 U.S. 520 (1875).
103. Id. at 524.
104. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964).
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tionis (private acts or acts of private law), which are within the ju-
risdiction of local courts.
10 5
The United States did not abandon the theory of absolute
immunity until 1952. The State Department enunciated its adop-
tion of the restrictive theory in a letter, written by Acting Legal
Adviser Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney General Philip B.
Perlman on May 19, 1952 (Tate Letter).10 6 The Tate Letter
"announced that, consistent with emerging international law, for-
eign states would be accorded immunity from suit in [U.S.] courts
for causes of action arising out of their sovereign or public acts, but
not for those arising out of their commercial or private activi-
ties." 107
Because the Tate Letter did not offer any guidelines or crite-
ria for differentiating between a sovereign's private and public
acts, 108 courts could not rely on a definite test to determine
whether a particular act was governmental or commercial. Conse-
quently, courts frequently used a variety of tests, including one
that examined the purpose of the act and another that looked at
the nature of the act. 109 Using another approach, the Second Cir-
cuit "established five categories as governmental acts per se [that]
conferred sovereign immunity": 110
1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
3) acts concerning the armed forces;
4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; and
5) public loans. 111
None of these tests, however, provided a clear-cut way to classify
105. See E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Immunity of
Foreign Sovereign From Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 A.L.R.3d 322, 335 (1969).
106. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), in DEP'T ST. BULL., June
1952, at 984 [hereinafter Tate Letter].
107. Patricia Hunt Holmes, Establishing Jurisdiction Under the Commercial-Activities
Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 19 HOuS. L. REV. 1003, 1005
(1982) (citing id. at 984-85).
108. See Schopler, supra note 105, at 337.
109. See Holmes, supra note 107, at 1005 n.14.
110. Id. (citing Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964)).
111. Victory Transport, 336 F.2d at 360.
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an act as governmental or commercial.
C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
To deal with the dilemma of determining whether a foreign
sovereign should be granted immunity, Congress passed the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).n12 Congress in-
tended the FSIA "[t]o define the jurisdiction of [U.S.] courts in
suits against foreign states,11 3 the circumstances in which foreign
states are immune from suit114 and in which execution may not be
levied on their property,1 5 and for other purposes."'1 16
1. Significance of the Act
In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,117 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the FSIA provides the sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts. 118 The
Supreme Court thus affirmed its statements in Verlinden B. V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria" 9 that "[t]he [FSIA] must be applied by
the District Courts in every action against a foreign sovereign,
[because] subject matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on
the existence of one of the specified exceptions to foreign sover-
eign immunity" and "if a court determines that none of the excep-
tions to sovereign immunity applies, the plaintiff will be barred from
112. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1995)).
113. Section 1330 provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount
in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) of this title [28 USCS § 1603(a)] as to any claim for relief in per-
sonam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity under
sections 1605-1607 of this title [28 USCS §§ 1605-1607] or under any applicable
international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for re-
lief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where
service has been made under section 1608 of this title [28 USCS § 1608].
28 U.S.C.S. § 1330 (Law Co-op. 1995).
114. See id. §1604.
115. See id. §§ 1609-1611.
116. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, sec. 1, 90 Stat. at 2891.
117. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
118. See id. at 434.
119. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
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raising his claim in any court in the United States."'120
More importantly, the FSIA provides courts with a test to
classify a foreign sovereign's activity as governmental or commer-
cial. The test determines the commercial character of an activity
"by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.'
121
Thus, the FSIA narrows the inquiry to the "nature-purpose dis-
tinction" 122 that courts previously used to determine whether to
grant immunity to a sovereign.123
Aside from providing a way for courts to distinguish between
governmental and commercial acts, Congress indicated that "the
general purposes of the [FSIA] were:
1) to codify the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity of
states;
2) to remove decisions on sovereign immunity from the ex-
ecutive branch and give them to the judiciary;
3) to provide a method of service of process for foreign state
defendants; and
4) to establish a method of satisfying in personam judg-
ments." 124
2. Entities to Which the FSIA Provides Immunity
It is clear from the FSIA's title that Congress intended to
provide immunity to foreign states. Section 1603(a) further de-
lineates entities that courts may construe as a "foreign state" in
addition to the entire foreign state itself. The section indicates
that the FSIA grants immunity to a political subdivision or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.125 To be considered
120. Id. at 493,497 (emphasis added).
121. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1603(d) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
122. The U.S. Supreme Court clarified the nature-purpose distinction in Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992), by creating a "private player test." See
Deirdre E. Whelan, Note, The Commercial Activity Exception in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1069, 1088 (1994). The
"test provided that where a foreign government acts as a market participant, or 'private
player,' rather than a market regulator, its activities are commercial in nature for pur-
poses of the FSIA." Id.
123. See Whelan, supra note 122, at 1088.
124. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7-8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
125. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1603(a).
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an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," an entity must
meet all of the following criteria:
(1) It must be a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise;
(2) It must be an organ or political subdivision of a foreign
state, or a foreign state or a political subdivision must own a major-
ity of the entity's shares; and
(3) It must neither be a citizen of a State of the United States,
as defined in section 1332 (c) and (d), nor created under the laws
of any third country.
126
3. Exceptions to Immunity
The FSIA does not completely preclude suits against foreign
states. Section 1605 does not recognize sovereign immunity:
(1) when the foreign sovereign nation explicitly waives it;
(2) when the action is based on commercial activity carried on
within the United States or materially affects U.S. interests;
(3) where property is taken in violation of international law;
(4) where property rights in gifts of immovable property are
involved;
(5) where a foreign state or its agent has committed a tort in
the United States;127 or
(6) where an agreement to submit to arbitration is to be en-
forced or an award made pursuant to such an agreement is to be
confirmed. 12
8
Of these six exceptions, parties and courts utilize the com-
mercial activity exception the most. 129 This exception allows U.S.
courts to hear claims against foreign sovereigns that are based
upon:
(1) a commercial activity that a foreign state carries on in the
United States;
(2) an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
126. See id. § 1603(b).
127. See Deborah L. Zimic, Recent Developments, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 221, 229-30
(1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(5)).
128. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1605(a)(6).
129. See Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1985);
Whelan, supra note 122, at 1083.
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(3) an act outside the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere, which causes a
direct effect in the United States. 1
30
Because Congress intended the courts to have a "great deal of
latitude" in applying these provisions, it defined the provisions
broadly. 131 Congress defined "commercial activity carried on in
the United States by a foreign state" in the first clause of the ex-
ception as "commercial activity carried on by such state and hav-
ing substantial contact with the United States."'132 Congress indi-
cated that the second clause "looks to conduct of the foreign state
in the United States [that] relates either to a regular course of
commercial conduct elsewhere or to a particular commercial
transaction concluded or carried out in part elsewhere."' 133 Con-
gress provided that the third clause covers "commercial conduct
abroad having direct effects within the United States [that] would
subject such conduct to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United
States consistent with principles set forth in section 18, Restate-
ment of the Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (1965)."134 In providing these general definitions, Congress
let the courts define the statute's specific terms and decide immu-
nity on a case-by-case basis.135
D. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson
Although Congress intended the FSIA to resolve the problem
of recognizing sovereign immunity, courts have been often called
upon to clarify Congress' broad definitions of the Act's provisions.
130. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1605(a)(2).
131. See Whelan, supra note 122, at 1083.
132. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1603(e).
133. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 19.
134. Id. This section indicates:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal corisequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory,
if either (a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably devel-
oped legal systems, or (b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements
of activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substan-
tial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice gen-
erally recognized by states that have reasonably legal systems.
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations of the United States §18 (1965).
135. See Whelan, supra note 122, at 1083.
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In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,136 the U.S. Supreme Court faced the
question of whether to grant immunity to a foreign government in
a U.S. court. The Court had to determine whether a foreign gov-
ernment's actions fell under the first clause of the FSIA's com-
mercial activity exception. 137 Despite the courts' wide latitude in
interpreting the FSIA, the Court in this case recognized foreign
sovereign immunity and barred the suit.
Scott Nelson, a U.S. citizen, found employment as a monitor-
ing systems engineer at the state-owned King Faisal Specialist
Hospital in Saudi Arabia 138 through the recruitment efforts of
Hospital Corporation of America, Ltd. (HCA) in the United
States. 39 He began working at the hospital in December 1993 and
"did his job without significant incident until March 1984, when he
discovered safety defects in the hospital's oxygen and nitrous oxide
lines that posed fire hazards and otherwise endangered patients'
lives. ' 140 When he told hospital officials of the safety defects, the
officials instructed him to ignore what he had observed. 141 Nel-
son's reports to a Saudi government commission likewise went un-
heard.1 42
The, hospital's response to Nelson's reports suddenly
changed on September 27, 1984, "when certain hospital employees
summoned him to the hospital's security office where agents of the
Saudi government arrested him. ' 143 The government agents put
Nelson in rat-infested and overcrowded jail cell where Nelson had
to fight other prisoners for food.144 The agents kept Nelson in jail
without informing him of the charges against him.145 In jail, the
136. 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
137. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1605(a)(2). This clause does not provide immunity for an ac-
tion based upon a commercial activity that a foreign state carries on in the United States.
138. See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 351.
139. HCA is "an independent corporation existing under the laws of the Cayman Is-
lands, [which] recruits Americans for employment at the hospital under an agreement
signed with Saudi Arabia in 1973." Id. at 351-52.
140. Id. at 352.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 353.
145. See id.
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Saudi agents "'shackled, tortured and beat"' Nelson. 146  The
agents repeatedly questioned Nelson in Arabic and later forced
him to sign a statement wiihout explaining its contents. 147 For
several days, the Saudi government did not tell Nelson's family of
his whereabouts. 148 Eventually, a Saudi official eventually told
Nelson's wife, Vivian, that he could arrange for her husband's re-
lease if she provided him with sexual favors. 149 The Saudi gov-
ernment finally released Nelson on November 5, 1984, thirty-nine
days after his arrest, at the personal request of U.S. Senator Ed-
ward Kennedy. 150
In 1988, Nelson and his wife filed an action in a district court
in Florida against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Spe-
cialist Hospital and HCA, to seek damages for personal injury. 151
The Nelsons argued that jurisdiction existed under the first clause
of section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA because their action was "'based
upon a commercial activity' that petitioners [the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia et al.] had 'carried on in the United States.""' 152 The dis-
trict court rejected their argument and dismissed the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.1 53 The court reasoned that, even
though "HCA's recruitment of Nelson in the United States might
properly be attributed to Saudi Arabia and the hospital, [such ac-
tion] did not amount to commercial activity 'carried on in the
United States' for purposes of the [FSIA]."'154 Furthermore,
"there was no sufficient 'nexus' between Nelson's recruitment and
the injuries alleged.' 155
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. It
"concluded that Nelson's recruitment and hiring were commercial
activities of Saudi Arabia and the hospital, carried on in the
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.; Tony Mauro, Case Focuses on Rights of U.S. Workers Overseas, USA
TODAY, Nov. 30, 1992, at 8A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
151. See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 353.
152. Id. at 354.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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United States for purposes of the Act, . . . and that the Nelsons'
action was 'based upon' these activities within the meaning of [the
FSIA]. ' 156 Also, unlike the district court, the Eleventh Circuit
found a "sufficient nexus between those commercial activities and
the wrongful acts that had allegedly injured the Nelsons: 'the de-
tention and torture of Nelson are so intertwined with his employ-
ment at the Hospital,' .... 'that they are "based upon" his recruit-
ment and hiring' in the United States."'1 57
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's reasoning and ruled against the Nelsons. It held that the
Nelsons' action was not based upon a commercial activity within
the meaning of the first clause of section 1605(a)(2) of the
FSIA. 158 Although HCA's recruitment and eventual employment
of Nelson constituted commercial activities and could be properly
attributed to Saudi Arabia, the Court found that they did not form
the basis of the Nelsons' suit. 159 It was not enough that these ac-
tivities had led to the conduct that eventually injured the Nelsons.
The Court required the foreign state's activities, which served as
the basis of suit, to have "something more than a mere connection
with, or relation to, commercial activity," in order for a court to
deny immunity under section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. 160 Using the
"private player" test developed in Republic of Argentina v. Welto-
ver, Inc.,16 1 the Court did not consider the Saudi government's
wrongful arrest, imprisonment, and torture of Nelson to be
"commercial activity" under the restrictive theory. 162 According
to the Court:
The conduct [alleged] boils down to abuse of the power of its
police by the Saudi Government, and however monstrous such
abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's exercise of the
power of its police has long been understood for purposes of
the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature. 163
156. Id. at 355.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 356.
159. See id. at 358.
160. Id.
161. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
162. See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 361.
163. Id.
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It appears from this decision that "the interest in preserving
the sovereign's independence outweighed the admittedly valid
concerns of Nelson in seeking redress."'164 More importantly, the
Court's narrow interpretation of "based upon" erects a substantial
barrier for U.S. workers abroad who are suing foreign states be-
cause defendants may argue that intentional injury is not based
upon commercial activity.
165
VII. PROVIDING U.S. CITIZENS WITH A MEANS OF REDRESS FOR
MISTREATMENT IN MIDDLE EASTERN PRISONS
A. Proposals for Change in the FSIA
Congress has repeatedly considered amendments to the FSIA,
but has not enacted any of them. For example, in 1986, several
congressmen introduced a bill, 166 which would have amended the
FSIA to:
(a) Clarify jurisdiction of the federal courts to enforce arbi-
tration agreements with and arbitral awards made against foreign
states and their agencies.
(b) Prohibit application of the Act of State Doctrine167 in
164. Whelan, supra note 122, at 1102 (emphasis added).
165. See, e.g., Santos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890, 893 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1991), where the Court stated:
As for injury, this element cannot be "based upon" commercial activity in the
United States even in principle. The commercial activity to which the statute [§
1605(a)(2)] refers is the activity of the defendant foreign government. By defi-
nition, the injury that the plaintiff asserts as an element of his case is his own.
Injury can still be a basis for jurisdiction, but.., not [under] the first clause.
166. See H.R. 3137, 99th Cong. (1985).
167. The U.S. Supreme Court defined the act of state doctrine in Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897), where it stated:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sov-
ereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of
by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Author Deborah L. Zimic distinguishes the act of state doctrine from the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity:
The act of state doctrine, unlike the doctrine of sovereign immunity, is a rule of
domestic law [that] prevents [U.S.] courts from adjudicating the acts of foreign
governments carried out within their own territorial limits. Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 855 (2d Cir. 1962). The Sabbatino decision
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specified categories of cases brought under the FSIA. 1
68
(c) Liberalize instances in which U.S. commercial assets
owned by a foreign state may be attached to satisfy a judgment.
(d) Establish conditions permitting prejudgment attachment
of property belonging to foreign governments engaged in U.S.
commercial activities. 1
69
Another bill that was intended to amend the FSIA, House Bill
2357, followed in 1991.170 Under this proposed amendment, U.S.
courts would have jurisdiction over tort suits brought against for-
eign governments for torture or extrajudicial killing of U.S. citi-
zens.171 The bill would have also allowed an individual who ob-
tained a judgment against a foreign government to attach that
government's property in the United States.172 During the hear-
ings on House Bill 2357, Professor John R. Schmertz testified that
the amendment should be limited to allowing suits by U.S. citizens
only when the plaintiff has exhausted all remedies in the foreign
state, which "has primary jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged civil
wrongs committed within its territorial bounds. ' 173 His opinion
would support foregoing the amendment of the FSIA and urging
noted that the act of state doctrine was designed to prevent the judiciary from
ruling on cases with possibly embarrassing repercussions for the executive and
legislative branches of government. Id. at 857. In addition, it proclaimed [U.S.]
courts unsuited to make a competent judgment regarding the affairs of a foreign
government within its own boundaries since they are too far removed from the
situation. Id.
Zimic, supra note 127, at 227 n.20.
168. This provision would prevent "foreign nations [from cloaking] commercial acts
with the act of state doctrine to avoid the [FSIA]," which foreign nations had been en-
couraged to do because "[t]raditional application of the act of state doctrine renders a
claim nonjusticiable in [U.S.] courts." Antonia Dolar, Comment, Act of State and Sover-
eign Immunities Doctrines: The Need to Establish Congruity, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 91, 101
(1982).
169. CONGRESSIONAL INFO. SERVICE INC., CIS/ANNUAL 1986: ABSTRACTS OF
CONGRESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES 355 (1986).
170. See H.R. 2357, 102d Cong. (1991).
171. See CONGRESSIONAL INFO. SERVICE, INC., CIS/ANNUAL 1992: ABSTRACTS OF
CONGRESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES 430 (1992).
172. See id.
173. Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Hearings on H.R. 2357
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Law, Immigration, and Refugees, 102d Cong. 83 (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 Hearing] (statement of John R. Schmertz, Jr., Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center).
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plaintiffs to rely instead on the Torture Victim Protection Act,174
which also requires the exhaustion of remedies in the state where
the alleged wrongful conduct occurred.
Congress considered a bill similar to House Bill 2357 as re-
cently as 1994.175 House Bill 934 would have added a "new ex-
ception to the FSIA that would allow suites [sic] against foreign
sovereigns that subject U.S. citizens to torture, extrajudicial kill-
ings or genocide and do not provide adequate remedies for those
harms. ' 176 The report on the bill indicated:
The difficulty U.S. citizens have had in obtaining remedies for
torture and other injuries suffered abroad illustrates the need
for remedial legislation. A foreign sovereign violates interna-
tional law if it practices torture, summary execution, or geno-
cide. Yet under current law a U.S. citizen who is tortured or
killed abroad [may not] sue the foreign sovereign in U.S. courts,
even when the foreign country wrongly refuses to hear the citi-
zen's case. Therefore, in some instance [sic] a U.S. citizens [sic]
who was tortured (or the family of one who was murdered) will
be without a remedy.
1 77
Members of Congress who opposed passage of House Bill 934
supported their views by referring to the State Department's ob-
jections to a similar Senate bill, 178 which would have "enable[d]
U.S. citizens to sue foreign governments in U.S. courts for dam-
ages resulting from acts of terrorism committed outside the United
States by those governments.' ' 179 State Department representa-
tives testified that the passage of the bill could lead other countries
to "modify their laws relating to foreign sovereign immunity, and
possibly modify them in ways not limited to torture, with the result
being that the United States could be sued in foreign courts for
acts which the U.S. Government might take in the United States
against foreign nationals.' ' 180 Additionally, the legislation's dis-
senters pointed out that the "risk to American assets abroad would
174. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
175. See H.R. 934, 103d Cong. (1994).
176. H.R. REP. No. 103-702, at 4 (1994).
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. See S. 825, 102d Cong. (1991).
179. H.R. REP. No. 103-702, at 12.
180. Id.
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be significant should other countries respond to the passage of
H.R. 934 by enacting further exceptions to their foreign sovereign
immunity laws which are broader in scope that [sic] is H.R.
934.-181
B. Relief Afforded to Aliens in the United States
Congress' prevailing lack of consensus on the passage of
amendments to the FSIA indicates that other interests outweigh
giving U.S. citizens the means to redress mistreatment in prisons
abroad. Ironically, aliens who file suits in U.S. courts against for-
eign states fare better than U.S. citizens. In 1995, the Second Cir-
cuit held in Kadic v. Karadzic182 that the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA) granted a U.S. federal court jurisdiction over a suit
brought by Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina
against Radovan Karadzic, President of the self-proclaimed
Bosnian-Serb republic of "Srpska. ' '183
In Kadic, appellants (plaintiffs in the first action), supported
their claims with the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala.184 The Filartaga court recognized that the ATCA provided
jurisdiction for suits alleging torts committed anywhere in the
world against aliens in violation of the law of nations. 185 Karadzic
argued that "the appellants had not alleged violations of the norms
of international law because such norms bind only states and per-
sons acting under color of a state's law, not private individuals. ' 186
Karadzic, however, claimed to be a private individual while assert-
ing to also be the President of the self-proclaimed Republic of
Srpska.187 The Second Circuit overlooked Karadzic's contradic-
tory assertions and held that "certain forms of conduct [such as
genocide and war crimes] violate the law of nations whether under-
taken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
181. Id.
182. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
183. See id. at 236-37.
184. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The case involved a suit by Joel Filartiga and Dolly
Filartiga, citizens of the Republic of Paraguay, against Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, the
Inspector-General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, who kidnapped and tortured to death
Joelito Filartiga, son and brother of the plaintiffs.
185. See id. at 877.
186. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
187. See id.
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individuals. ,188
The Second Circuit also held that it had jurisdiction over ap-
pellants' claims of torture, even though international law pro-
scribed only torture committed by state officials or under color of
law, because customary international law "applie[d] to states with-
out distinction between recognized and unrecognized states."
189
The court found that, although not officially recognized as a state,
Srpska functioned like one: it had a president, a legislature and its
own currency; it controlled defined territory and populations
within its power; and it has entered into agreements with other
governments. 9° The court found a sufficient basis for jurisdiction
and stated that:
[I]t is likely that the state action concept, where applicable for
some violations like "official" torture, requires merely the sem-
blance of official authority. The inquiry, after all, is whether a
person purporting to wield official power has exceeded inter-
nationally recognized standards of civilized conduct, not
whether statehood in all its formal aspects exists.1 91
The court further found that Karadzic acted under color of
state law when he acted in concert with the former Yugoslavia,
whose statehood is not disputed.192 The court based this conclu-
sion on Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,193 where the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a private individual acts under color of state law
within the meaningof 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when he acts together with
state officials or with significant state aid.194
C. Policy Considerations
The Kadic court gave great weight to the international law
violation in finding jurisdiction over the aliens' claims against a
sovereign state. Writing along the same lines, Professor Jordan
Paust asserts that:
[A] State's violation of international law is precisely one of
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 245.
190. See id.
191. Id. (emphasis added).
.192. See id.
193. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
194. Id. at 941 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
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those circumstances that are not "essentially within" the do-
mestic jurisdiction of a particular State. Thus, even those vio-
lations of international law that occur entirely within a particu-
lar State's territory are of international concern and are not
immune to responsive action by or on behalf of the international
community. 1
95
In another article, Professor Paust notes that "'sovereignty' is
conditioned on obedience to international law, the law upon which
sovereignty rests. ' 196 Furthermore, he states that:
[A]cts taken in violation of international law are not and cannot
be acts performed in the exercise of a state's legitimate sover-
eign authority [because] no state has the authority to violate in-
ternational law. Moreover, such acts are treated as if they are
outside the sovereign function and merely "private acts."' 197
To support this assertion, Professor Paust cites Letelier v. Re-
public of Chile,198 where the court held that:
[T]here is no discretion to commit, or to have one's officers or
agents commit, an illegal act .... Whatever policy options may
exist for a foreign country, it has no "discretion" to perpetuate
conduct designed to result in the assassination of an individual
or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to the precepts of
humanity as recognized in both national and international
law.199
Another policy reason for not granting foreign states immu-
nity for international law violations stems from the "passive per-
sonality" principle. This principle is based on "a state's important
195. Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of
State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 221-22 (1983) (emphasis added) (footnotes omit-
ted).
196. Jordan J. Paust, Document, Draft Brief Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign
Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity for Violations of International Law Under the
FSIA, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49, 59 (1985).
197. Id.
198. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980). The case involved a suit by survivors of former
Chilean ambassador and foreign minister Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt against the
Republic of Chile. Plaintiffs alleged that the Republic of Chile had directed the construc-
tion, planting, and detonation of the bomb that destroyed Letelier's car and killed both its
passengers.
199. Id. at 673.
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interest in protecting its citizens against wrongful acts committed
against them in other states." 200 If the foreign state fails to punish
its citizen-wrongdoer, "the United States may do so in the interests
of justice and by virtue of its right to protect its citizens. ' 201 In-
deed, by punishing the wrongdoer, the United States would be
following"paragraph 10 of Resolution 1993/40 of the Commission
on Human Rights, in which the Commission:
[e]ndorses the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur that
those who violate article 7 of the Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights,202 whether by encouraging, ordering, tolerating or
perpetrating prohibited acts, must be held responsible and that
whenever a complaint of torture is found to be justified, the
perpetrators should be severely punished, especially the official
in charge of the place of detention where the torture is found to
have taken place.20 3
D. The Ideal Amendment to the FSIA
The above policy considerations and the unmatched ability of
aliens in the United States to sue foreign governments in U.S.
courts make clear that the FSIA should be amended to benefit
U.S. citizens who have been mistreated in prisons. The most recent
bill considered by Congress 204 provides a satisfactory framework
for an amendment. This new law would allow suits against foreign
sovereigns that torture U.S. citizens and do not provide adequate
remedies for those harms, even if the case does not fall under one
of the exceptions in section 1605 of the FSIA. Congressmen's con-
cerns about extending jurisdiction in this manner, such as the dan-
ger of losing U.S. assets abroad, are almost inconsequential when
compared to leaving a foreign state's mistreatment of U.S. citizens
in prison unredressed. Forcing U.S. citizens to litigate their cause
200. 1992 Hearing, supra note 173, at 91 (statement of John R. Schmertz, Jr., Profes-
sor, Georgetown University Law Center).
201. Id.
202. This article indicates: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation." International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 7, at 370.
203. Res. 1993/40, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, reprinted in 1 INT'L HUM. RTS.
REP. 218 (1994).
204. See H.R. 934, 103d Cong. (1994).
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of action abroad, which the Torture Victim Protection Act re-
quires, would only prolong the harm. A government that con-
dones mistreatment in prisons is unlikely to have courts willing to
punish its native wrongdoers. Thus, the FSIA should be amended
to allow U.S. citizens to sue foreign states in U.S. courts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Scott Nelson was neither the first U.S. citizen to be abused in
a foreign prison nor will he be the last. Although the recognition
of a foreign state's sovereignty is important to maintaining inter-
national order, Congress and the courts should strive harder to
consider the interests of tortured U.S. citizens in seeking redress of
their injuries in the United States as a way of promoting human
rights. After all, as the "leader of the free world," the United
States ought to set the example in advancing the rights of both its
citizens and the foreigners who seek refuge within its borders.
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